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CURRENT LEGISLATION
RECENT CHANGES IN SECTION 17, SUBDIVISION I, OF THE
NEW YORK VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW.'-The recent bus tragedy
of July 22, 1934, left in its wake a score of litigations, the compensa-
tory outcome of which depends greatly, if not solely, upon the insur-
ance secured by the bus owners. With a view toward protecting the
public from further exposure to such a condition of limited liability,
Governor Lehman, on July 31 in a special message to both houses,
urged the legislature to amend the Vehicle and Traffic Law. He
called for measures both preventive and compensatory.
In the preventive class he proposed that the regulation for all
busses for hire be put in the hands of the Public Service Commission;
that the duty of the commission should be to inspect all busses for
hire (carying more than seven passengers), to see that they are
properly equipped with safety appliances; that the ownership and
place of storage should be filed with the Public Service Commission
in order to facilitate the inspections; that the power to suspend regis-
tration for such violations should be increased from six months to
one year. 2 The license to operate a motor vehicle is not a right but
a privilege and the legislature may prescribe on what conditions it
shall be exercised.3 The Motor Vehicle Commissioner has summary
power to suspend temporarily, a license or certificate of registration,
without notice, for proper cause. 4 It was proposed that, withal, that
this transfer of supervision to the Public Service Commission should
not yield any of the enforceable provisions of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law, and violations of the outlined safety regulations should be made
offenses under the Vehicle and Traffic Law.5
With respect to compensation, it was proposed that the indem-
nity requirements on busses for hire were not adequate for public
protection and, to become so, must be raised." The Governor's bill
proposed an insurance requirement of at least five thousand dollars
a passenger.7
Spokesmen for leading bus companies indicated their consent in
placing all busses under the jurisdiction of the Public Service Com-
mission, objecting however, to the legislature's fixing the price of
the bond, the demand being made that such be left to the Public
Service Commission.8
Subsequently, the senate approved two measures providing for
the stricter regulation of busses. One, the Palmer Bill, proposed the
placing of all busses including chartered carriers under the super-
Laws of 1934, c. 902.
' N. Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1934, at 1:3.
'People v. Stryker, 124 Misc. 1, 206 N. Y. Supp. 146 (1924); People v.
Hartnett, 221 App. Div. 487, 224 N. Y. Supp. 97 (4th Dept. 1927).
'Op. Att'y Gen-130 (1925).
Supra note 1.0 Ibid.
7 N. Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1934, at 12:2.
8Ibid.
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vision of the Public Service Commission. The other, the D. T.
O'Brien measure, had as its aim the increase of insurance require-
ments on busses to at least five thousand dollars per passenger.9 As
they stood, they were not adopted.
But as a result of the aforementioned proposals, Section 17,
subdivision I of the Vehicle and Traffic Law was amended.10 The
amendment was not as drastic as the aforementioned proposals would
have it. The authority with which he had been previously vested
was retained by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and no addi-
tional rights to supervise were bestowed upon the Public Service
Commission. The proposal by the Governor," that busses operating
on a franchise should be included within the scope of the section,
has not been followed. The scope of the Law has not beefi changed;
the vehicles excepted by the Law remain the same.' 2
The only vital change in the Law was the increase in the rate of
bonded security. Prior to the amendment 13 the requirements on each
vehicle defined, limited the bond demanded as follows: "Such bond
or policy may limit the liability of the surety or insurer on any onejudgment to twenty-five hundred dollars for bodily injuries or death,
and five hundred dollars for damage to or destruction of property,
and on all judgments recovered upon claims arising out of the same
transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action
to five thousand dollars for bodily injuries or death and one thousand
dollars for damages to or destruction of property." 14 The amended
law is more discriminatory. It classifies the vehicles that are within
the design of the statute by fixing the bond required in proportion
to the passenger volume of each vehicle. It defines ". . . a minimum
sum, hereinafter called minimum liability, on any one judgment, and
a maximum sum hereinafter called a maximum liability on all judg-
ments . . .," " for the purpose of such classification and continues
by distinguishing the damages to person from those pertaining to
property. "For damages for and incident to death or injuries to
persons" 16 the vehicles are divided into five groups, and the bond
or insurance policy for the amount required for minimum liability
and for maximum liability, is clearly defined and may be tabulated
for each vehicle, as follows:
'N. Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1934, at 15:2.
" Supra note 1.
Supra note 2.
"Laws of 1932, c. 340; Laws of 1934, c. 902.
"Supra note 1.
' Laws of 1932, c. 340.
"Supra note 1.
"Ibid.
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Minimum Maximum
Liability Liability
Seating Capacity of Bond of Bond
1. Not more than 7 passengers ............... $2,500 $5,000
2. Not less than 8 nor more than 12
passengers ............................................ 5,000 15,000
3. Not less than 13 nor more than 20
passengers ............................................ 5,000 25,000
4. Not less than 21 nor more than 30
passengers ............................................ 5,000 40,000
5. More than 30 passengers .................... 5,000 50,000
"For damages for and incident to injury to or destruction of prop-
erty; for each motor vehicle a bond or insurance policy with a mini-
mum liability of one thousand dollars and a maximum liability of five
thousand dollars." 17
From the above it is readily discernible that the amendment,
although literally involving changes in several portions of Section 17,
really is pertinent to one modification, that being an increase in the
bonded liability of the owner of the vehicle in question.
This change in the statute, although affecting it in only one
respect, may subject it to the same attacks of unconstitutionality to
which the original statute 1 8 and the prior amendments 19 were ex-
posed. A presumption of the outcome is not within the writer's
task, but a recapitulation of the cases involved in this question may
be of timely assistance to the reader at arriving at some conclusion.
The constitutionality of a law calling for the securing of a bond
or insurance policy by owners of motor vehicles has been assailed 20
particularly as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.
One attack was on the theory that the law 2 1 was "discrimina-
tory and [that it] denied equal protection of the law," 22 inasmuch
as it imposed a burden on one class of people while it exempted other
persons similarly situated; 23 and discriminated against people oper-
ating motor vehicles for hire, in favor of people operating such
I'7 bid.
N. Y. HIGHWAY LAW §282-b (now §17 N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC
LAW).
"Laws of 1922, c. 612 (amending N. Y. HIGHWAY LAW §282-b) ; Laws of
1925, C. 315.
' People v. Martin, 203 App. Div. 423, 197 N. Y. Supp. 28 (1st Dept.
1922), 235 N. Y. 550, 139 N. E. 730 (1923) ; Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S.
140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (1924); Welch v. Hartnett, 127 Misc. 221, 215 N. Y.
Supp. 540 (1926).
2 1Laws of 1922, c. 612 (amending N. Y. HIGHWAY LAW §282-b).
'People v. Martin, 203 App. Div. 423, 197 N. Y. Supp. 28 (1st Dept.
1922), 235 N. Y. 550, 139 N. E. 730 (1923).
=' Ibid.
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vehicles for their own private use.24 Courts have held, however, that
"in operating a motor vehicle the operator exercises a privilege which
might be denied him and not a right and that in a case of privilege
the Legislature may prescribe on what grounds it may be exercised." 25
The legislature has a right to protect the people of the state who are
in danger of injury from automobiles.2 6  "If the State determines
that the use of streets for private purposes in the usual and ordinary
manner shall be preferred over their use by common carriers for hire,
there is nothing in the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent. The
streets belong to the public and are primarily for the uses of the
public in the ordinary way." 27
Another contention in which the owner sought shelter was under
the claim that the clause in the statute 28 requiring continuing lia-
bility is "unreasonable, confiscatory and onerous." 29 Such allega-
tions were not upheld.3° The Law would not accomplish its purpose
if, when the bond was extinguished by the recovery of a judgment,
the vehicle owner could continue operating without violating the law
until the State Tax Commission became aware of such and called
on him to give a new bond. 3' "The best answer is that surety com-
panies are concededly giving such bonds to comply with the law,
without qualification or delay and that there is no proof that the
cost of the bond is increased measurably or in fact at all by such
requirement." 32
Without doubt the most important assault against the statute's 33
constitutionality and one most pertinent to the recent amendment, is
the charge that "the bond was so great as to be confiscatory," 34 and
"the requirements so burdensome as to amount to confiscation, re-
sulting in deprivation of property without due process of law." 35
In considering this question it must be borne in mind that in the
cases decided to point in this state,3 6 the question of confiscation was
raised corelatively with the charges of discrimination and arbitrary
classification previously mentioned and in the court's ruling, the de-
fenses of the Law's validity were coincident and not tangibly sep-
arable, so that the answer to one question necessarily involved the
answer to the other. For the sake of clarity, it becomes necessary,
therefore, to stress a point previously mentioned which is worthy of
Packard v. Banton, supra note 20.
Supra notes 3 and 4.
". Supra note 22.
- Supra note 24.
N. Y. HIGHWAY LAW §282-b (amended by Laws of 1934, c. 902).
-' Supra note 22.
Ibid.
Ibid.
2 Ibid.
' Supra notes 18 and 19.
'Supra note 22.
' Supra note 24.
" 62-A MCKINNEY, CONSOLIDATED LAWS OF NEW YORK (1929) §17.
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repetition, viz., "in operating a motor vehicle, the operator exercises
a privilege which might be denied him and not a right and that in a
case of privilege the Legislature may prescribe on what grounds it
may be exercised." 37 The court, in Packard v. Banton, in reply to
the plaintiff's assertion that the insurance premium required was so
great as to embody half the money earned by the vehicle, declared
with respectful disdain for the sum involved, that the requirement
of the law was not unconstitutional, saying "the operator under the
Statute is not confined to this method (insurance policy) but instead
may file either a personal bond with two approved sureties or a cor-
porate surety bond." 38 (In respect to this answer the statute has
not been changed. 39 ) In answer to the plaintiff's insistence that he
could not secure a personal bond, the court said, "it does not appear
that he might not procure the corporate surety bond at a less cost." 40
The fact that expenses sustained by the owner of property, due to
the exercise of the police power of the state or the passage of rem-
edial statutes for the public interest, even though they may amount
to more than he can temporarily stand, has no effect on the validity
of the Law if the exercise of the power is reasonable.4
1
Again remembering that the court classifies the operation of a
motor vehicle as a privilege, it has been held,42 "Moreover a dis-
tinction must be observed between the regulation of an activity which
may be engaged in as a matter of right and one carried on by Gov-
ernment sufferance or permission. In the latter case the power to
exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to condition
and may justify a degree of regulation not admissible in the
former." 43
The inevitable conclusion to which one must come from the
decisions outlined above, and which due to the lack of change must
necessarily pertain to the Law as it existed up until the time of the
present amendment,44 is as follows:
1. The constitutionality of the statute pertaining to the pro-
curement of an insurance policy or bond by the owner of motor
vehicles cannot be assailed on the grounds of discrimination or of
unequal distribution of law.4u The amended law has not been changed
in any respect sufficient to admit any new grounds for alleged dis-
crimination.46 In fact it has become less so, for since the case of
Supra notes 24 and 3.
'Supra note 24.
'Supra note 1.
'
0 Supra note 24.
' Supra note 22; also see Health Dep't of the City of New York v.
Rector, etc. of Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833 (1895).
,2 Supra note 24.
3 Ibid.
"Supra note 1.
"Supra note 20.
"Supra note 1.
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Packard v. Banton the alleged discrimination against vehicle owners
in a city of the first class 47 has been removed 48 and the law 49 now
applies to vehicles on all highways within the state.
2. With respect to the clause in the statute 50 requiring con-
tinuing liability, the court in People v. Martin has definitely decided
that it is not "confiscatory and onerous," 51 and is in no way opposed
to the Federal Constitution. 52
3. With regard to that clause of the statute, as it existed at the
time and continued to exist until the current amendment was made,
requiring that the vehicle owners be bonded or insured for a certain
named sum,53 it has been held that such was a valid and reasonable
exercise of the police power of the state.54  The Law, pertinent to
decisions on this point, has been changed in that the amount of the
insurance or bond required has been raised, and the question whether
such change is a reasonable 5 exercise of the state's police power is,
in this writer's opinion, the only question on which the validity of
the amended statute can possibly be contested.
HENRY J. O'HAGAN.
' Laws of 1922, c. 612; supra note 24.
"Supra note 1.
,9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
"Supra note 22.
U. S. CONSTITUTION, Amend. 14, Sec. 1.
"Laws of 1932, c. 340; Laws of 1922, c. 612.
" Supra note 20.
"Legislation is most clearly within the scope of the police power, which
has for its object the protection of the health, safety, good order, and the
morals of the community." BuRDIcK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTION (1922) §270, p. 563.
